Emerging powers and peace operations: An agenda for research by Peter, Mateja
1Policy Brief
Emerging powers and peace 
operations: An agenda 
for research
Dr. Mateja Peter
This report outlines some possible future directions for 
research on the emerging powers and peace operations. It 
identifies differences and commonalities among these powers 
as regards their stances on third-party interventions. It then 
briefly outlines the changing reality of peace operations. I 
conclude by indicating potential avenues for future research. 
Most of the discussion concentrates on UN peace operations; 
however, to elucidate the positions of the emerging powers, I 
explore their relations to non-UN operations as well.
Similar but different 
While the term ‘emerging powers’ has become ubiquitous 
in international relations, it is not easy to define. The list of 
states included as emerging powers can differ, depending 
on the research topic. These same states are often referred 
to as ‘rising powers’ or ‘emerging economies’, showing that 
an important criterion is their higher-than-average economic 
growth. It is through their rising economic importance that 
emerging powers gain their influence in other fields. The 
term was originally associated with the BRICS grouping 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) – an acronym 
coined by the chief economist at Goldman Sachs.6 These 
states remain at the core of the emerging powers. However, 
the list is often supplemented with others, notably the MINT 
grouping (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey), and often 
Egypt and Argentina. Concerning peace and security mat-
ters, Pakistan and Bangladesh – as the biggest police- and 
troop-contributing countries – are sometimes added. 
Emerging powers as a grouping are difficult to approach in 
analyses that look beyond their economic potential. What 
undoubtedly binds them together is that they are becoming 
more vocal and persuasive in international institutions, and 
that they all aspire to more influential roles in international 
affairs.7 However, in seeking to make themselves heard in 
issues of international peace and security, they start from 
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The emerging powers have become a major focus of research. 
Initial interest in their economic potential has developed into 
attentiveness to their engagement in global governance more 
generally. Studies on their economic trajectories and impact1 
have been supplemented with works on their role in climate 
governance,2 development and foreign aid,3 innovation and 
technology,4 as well as more general studies on their geopo-
litical significance.5 Most attention has concerned how their 
rise might challenge the international institutions and liberal 
norms that have underpinned the post-Second World War, 
and especially the post-Cold War, order. 
The emerging powers have also become important actors in 
third-party interventions in conflict and post-conflict areas. 
They are increasingly involved in peacekeeping, special 
political missions, regional operations and training mis-
sions: multilateral peace operations, both UN and non-UN. 
Traditionally seen as troop-contributing countries and norm 
takers, they are becoming more vocal and are asking to con-
tribute substantively to the course and future of peace opera-
tions. Their positions on peace operations are growing more 
consequential, and merit in-depth research. 
1 E.g., Uwe Becker, The BRICs and emerging economies in com-
parative perspective: political economy, liberalisation and insti-
tutional change (London: Routledge, 2013); Andrea Goldstein, 
‘Multinational companies from emerging economies: composi-
tion, conceptualization & direction in the global economy’, In-
dian Journal of Industrial Relations (2009); Jim O’Neill, Building 
better global economic BRICs (Goldman Sachs, 2001). 
2 E.g., David Held, Charles Roger and Eva-Maria Nag, eds, Climate 
governance in the developing world (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013.) 
3 E.g., Iain Watson, Foreign aid and emerging powers: Asian 
perspectives on Official Development Assistance (London: 
Routledge, 2014). 
4 E.g., Jose Eduardo Cassiolato and Virginia Vitorino, eds, BRICS 
and development alternatives: innovation systems and policies 
(London: Anthem Press, 2009). 
5 E.g., Cedric de Coning, Thomas Mandrup and Liselotte Odgaard, 
The BRICS and coexistence: an alternative vision of world order 
(London: Routledge, 2014); Amrita Narlikar, New powers: how 
to become one and how to manage them (London: Hurst, 2010).
6  O’Neill, Building better global economic BRICs. 
7 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space 
for would be great powers?’, International Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006). 
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 8  Marco Wyss and Thierry Tardy, eds, Peacekeeping in Africa: the 
evolving security architecture (London: Routledge, 2014), 6. 
 9 E.g., Miwa Hirono and Marc Lanteigne, ‘Introduction: China and 
UN peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping 18, no. 3 (2011); 
Stefan Staehle, ‘China’s shifting attitude towards United Nations 
peacekeeping operations’, The China Quarterly 195 (2008); Pang 
Zhongying, ‘China’s changing attitude to UN peacekeeping’, In-
ternational Peacekeeping 12, no. 1 (2005).
10 E.g., Oksana Antonenko, ‘Russia, NATO and European security 
after Kosovo’, Survival 41, no. 4 (1999); Sergei Borisov, ‘Rus-
sia: standing firm’, Transitions Online 3, no. 10 (2003); Samuel 
Charap, ‘Russia, Syria and the doctrine of intervention’, Survival 
55, no. 1 (2013); Galia Golan, ‘Russia and the Iraq War: was 
Putin’s policy a failure?’, Communist and Post-Communist Stud-
ies 37, no. 4 (2004); Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Chandra 
Thakur, Kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention: 
selective indignation, collective action, and international citizen-
ship (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000).
11 Alan Bullion, ‘India and UN peacekeeping operations’, Interna-
tional Peacekeeping 4, no. 1 (1997). 
12 United Nations Peacekeeping, Troop and police contributors, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/con-
tributors.shtml (accessed 18 November 2014). 
radically different positions and thus often differ in their 
stances. It is therefore not surprising that most studies of 
the role of emerging powers in peace operations focus on 
individual countries or clusters of countries with similar 
characteristics, for example, troop- and police-contributing 
countries (TCCs and PCCs). 
Even institutionally these countries play differing roles when 
it comes to conflict response. China and Russia are perma-
nent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), giving 
them a seat – with veto power – at the table where all peace 
and security affairs are discussed, and peace operations are 
either authorised or contested. It is primarily this privileged 
position that has been of interest to scholars. Their role in the 
UNSC has never been one of initiator: it is ‘the three Western 
permanent members of the Council (P3) [that] dominate the 
African [and broader – M.P.] peace and security agenda’.8 
Instead, both China and Russia have been primarily under-
stood as powers ‘blocking’ the global North’s agenda in 
peace operations. Some recent analyses have tried to grasp 
more deeply the philosophy behind Chinese positions on 
peacekeeping.9 However, Russian stances, as well as Chinese 
ones, often come under scrutiny primarily due to their threat 
or actual exercise of veto power. The extent of literature on 
Russian and Chinese impacts on developments around Kos-
ovo 1999, Iraq 2003 and Syria 2012 is indeed telling.10  
On the other side are the emerging powers without permanent 
seats in the UNSC. While most of them attend regular meet-
ings between the TCCs/PCCs and the Security Council, they 
hold less direct influence over the inception and mandates of 
peace operations. Some – especially India, Brazil and South 
Africa – hope that, with a potential UN reform, they could 
gain one of the coveted seats on the Security Council and thus 
acquire a more prominent decision-making role. A strong argu-
ment in India’s bid for a seat has always been its peacekeeping 
contributions.11 The majority of emerging powers are major 
troop- and police-contributing countries. As of this writing, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nigeria and Egypt all rank among 
the top 10, with South Africa, China and Indonesia in the top 
20 contributors to UN uniformed capacities.12 Historically a 
reluctant participant, China has over the last decade become 
the biggest contributor of all permanent UNSC members.
While emerging powers’ participation as troop contributors 
has long been recognised, most current debates emphasise 
that their role in the field is not matched by their participa-
tion in decision- and policymaking on the topic within the UN 
bureaucracy, nor in their representation in the civilian com-
ponent. The emergence of this discourse coincides with the 
rise of a broader debate on emerging powers, showing that 
their (perceived) ambitions began increasing with their eco-
nomic rise.13  In recent scholarly and policy debates harsher 
tones are evident, criticising this inequality by even calling 
the division of work between traditional and emerging pow-
ers ‘a blue helmet caste system’,14 ‘apartheid’,15 and ‘imperial 
multilateralism’.16 Many policy-oriented works thus argue for 
not just a reform of current institutions but increased South–
South cooperation as well. 
One fruitful discussion where advances have been made 
focuses on why emerging powers, and nations from the global 
South in general, participate in peace operations. A long-run-
ning stereotype in these debates has been that the incentives 
are financial. Or as asserted in an article in The Economist, ‘[t]
hey fund their armed forces by sending them abroad at the 
UN’s expense.’17  In his recent book Philip Cunliffe systemati-
cally takes apart this stereotype by providing figures showing 
that while some smaller countries (Rwanda, Ghana, Nepal) 
finance a quarter and more of their military budgets out of UN 
missions, the largest contributors earn comparatively little.18 
We need to search for other possible reasons and motives. 
These are invariably mixed, not least as these states are in 
different regions and have different needs for contributing to 
peace operations. Motivations can vary from pressure from 
allies; questions of prestige, including claims to a permanent 
seat on the UNSC; repayment for being previous beneficiaries 
or potential future recipients of peace operations; as well as 
internal benefits, such as diversion of uniformed personnel 
from domestic politics, socialisation of armed forces, and 
broader learning from experience.19 However, the big ques-
tion remains: to what extent is the participation of emerging 
powers – China in particular – motivated by their attempts to 
revise the liberal underpinnings of existing peace operations? 
The emerging powers’ differing motivations influence their 
preferences for type of participation in peace operations. 
First, some emerging powers participate only in UN-led 
13 E.g., Kabilan Krishnasamy, ‘‘Recognition’ for Third World peace-
keepers: India and Pakistan’, International Peacekeeping 8, no. 4 
(2001); Prof Maxi Schoeman, ‘South Africa as an emerging mid-
dle power’, African Security Review 9, no. 3 (2000). 
14 Colum Lynch, ‘The blue helmet caste system’, Foreign Policy, 
11 April, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/04/11/the_
blue_helmet_caste_system’ (2013).
15 Simon Chesterman, ‘The use of force in UN peace operations’, 
Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (External Study), smallwars-
journal.com/documents/useofforceunpko.pdf (undated), 11. 
16 Philip Cunliffe, Legions of peace: UN peacekeepers from the Glo-
bal South (London: Hurst, 2013), 20.
17 The Economist, ‘UN peacekeepers in Africa: helping to calm a conti-
nent, 9 June, http://www.economist.com/node/21556608’ (2012). 
18 Cunliffe, Legions of peace: 168–74. 
19 For more on this see Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, eds, 
Providing peacekeepers: the politics, challenges and future of Unit-
ed Nations peacekeeping contributions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013); Andrew Blum, ‘Blue Helmets from the South: ac-
counting for the participation of weaker states in United Nations 
peacekeeping operations’, Journal of Conflict Studies 20, no. 1 
(2000); Cunliffe, Legions of peace; Trevor Findlay, Challenges for 
the new peacekeepers, SIPRI Research Report No. 12 (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1996) .
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operations, others also in regional ones – for reasons often 
connected to geography and alliances. Turkey is active in 
NATO operations and often contributes personnel to Euro-
pean Union missions.20  South Africa and Nigeria are major 
players in the African Union and sub-regional organisations, 
and participate in their peace involvements.21 Asia, however, 
has no strong regional institutions focused on peace and 
security, so the Asian emerging powers engage through UN 
missions. However, the very fact that China, India, Indonesia 
and Pakistan have not attempted to promote regional organi-
sations that could mount peace operations shows their strong 
preference for universal mandates through the UN Security 
Council. Second, some emerging powers prefer regional, and 
others global deployments.22  India, for example, has partici-
pated in missions in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin 
America. By contrast, African emerging powers tend to send 
their peacekeepers to operations in Africa. Here, Egypt is usu-
ally singled out as an emerging power with a regional reach. 
These differences can be explained partly by the fact that 
most peace operations take place in Africa. However, they 
may also signify that emerging powers hold differing ambi-
tions – ranging from regional-power to global-power status. 
So where are the commonalities?
Finding differences between emerging powers is easier than 
determining what binds them together. Much discussion in 
the general literature on emerging powers deals with this 
question.23 Many of these broader findings apply also to their 
engagement with peace operations, most notably the argu-
ment that emerging powers – as individual states – aspire to 
a more influential role in international affairs. However, such 
rising ambitions can be as much of a dividing as a binding 
force between them. States of the global North are bound not 
only by geography, but also by similar ideological inclination, 
which has influenced their approaches to peace operations. 
Much has been written on the liberal and democratic peace 
thesis underpinning the global North’s approaches to third-
party interventions.24 It is generally accepted that peace oper-
ations (and peacebuilding) today rest on agreement between 
states from the global North and international organisations 
as to the broad goals. Richmond calls this ‘a peacebuilding 
consensus’.25 Is there something similar that connects emerg-
ing powers? To what extent could such a shared understand-
ing present a challenge to the dominant discourse?
One major commonality between emerging powers stems from 
their historically disenfranchised positions. A great majority 
of them have a European colonial legacy. Many had to struggle 
to gain their independence, and they are wary of continued 
meddling in their internal affairs by states and institutions of 
the global North. As a result, they are deeply sceptical of third 
parties intervening in the internal affairs of other states. Not 
least, some may fear that this could set a precedent, and such 
practices could be applied to them in the future. Emerging 
powers put great emphasis on respect for sovereignty. Host-
state consent matters deeply to them, and they have been 
known to draw clear lines between peace enforcement and 
peacekeeping – especially with UN-led operations. Emerg-
ing powers support adherence to the three peacekeeping 
principles – consent, impartiality and the non-use of force.26 
However, there are some indications that their stances on this 
could be relaxing in light of new security realities.
What further unites emerging powers is the fact that they 
are often experiencing their own governance issues. Their 
political systems are generally less consolidated than those 
of their counterparts in the global North. Some have recently 
undergone political transitions; some are still experiencing 
authoritarian tendencies. They are therefore sensitive to the 
inclusion of certain topics within the mandates of peace 
operations. The human rights agenda has always been a 
problematic issue for these states: partly because their own 
human rights records are often questionable and partly 
because they view the human rights concept as part of the 
‘liberal’ agenda.27  Institutional reform – in particular, secu-
rity sector reform (SSR) – has been another such issue. While 
SSR has risen high on the agenda of Northern states, emerg-
ing powers see their militaries and police as the core of their 
independence and sovereignty, and are reluctant to sanc-
tion third-party interventions in these sensitive domains. 
As staunch proponents of national ownership of any reform 
process, emerging powers have traditionally advocated for 
peacekeeping mandates with limited governance agendas. 
The shifting sands of peace operations
Peace operations have undergone substantial change. The 
early 2000s saw the rise of non-UN led stabilisation missions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. With the notable exception of Tur-
key – at one point the third largest contributor to the NATO-
led ISAF operation in Afghanistan – the emerging powers 
stayed away from these operations. Many, including Russia 
and China, opposed the operation in Iraq, with the African 
Union condemning the war. At the time, most emerging 
powers saw a stark difference between peace operations and 
stabilisation missions. However, these operations and the 
continued presence of non-state and unconventional threats 
sensitised the international community as a whole to more 
robust operations. Recently, even the UN Security Council 
has been willing to authorise missions that walk the fine line 
between peace enforcement and peacekeeping. 
Recent UN peacekeeping missions have unprecedentedly 
robust mandates, further expanding and drawing attention to 
the range of activities the international community has come 
20 Thierry Tardy, ‘CSDP: getting third states on board’, European 
Union Institute for Security Studies Brief 6, March (2014); Petros 
Vamvakas, ‘NATO and Turkey in Afghanistan and Central Asia: 
possibilities and blind spots’, Turkish Studies 10, no. 1 (2009). 
21 See Victor A.O. Adetula, ‘Nigeria’s rebased economy and its role 
in regional and global politics’, 13 October, http://www.e-ir.
info/2014/10/13/nigerias-rebased-economy-and-its-role-in-re-
gional-and-global-politics/ (2014); Chris Alden and Maxi Schoe-
man, ‘South Africa in the company of giants: the search for leader-
ship in a transforming global order’, International Affairs 89, no. 
1 (2013); Peter Kagwanja, ‘Power and peace: South Africa and the 
refurbishing of Africa’s multilateral capacity for peacemaking’, 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 24, no. 2 (2006).
22 See supra note 19. 
23 See supra note 7. 
24  E.g., David Chandler, Empire in denial: the politics of state-building 
(London: Pluto, 2006); Roger M. Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, 
‘Myth or reality: opposing views on the liberal peace and post-war 
reconstruction’, Global Society 21, no. 4 (2007); Roland Paris, ‘Sav-
ing liberal peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies 36 (2010).
25 Oliver P. Richmond, ‘UN peace operations and the dilemmas of 
the peacebuilding consensus’, International Peacekeeping 11, 
no. 1 (2004). 
26 United Nations, ‘United Nations peacekeeping: principles and 
guidelines (Capstone Doctrine)’, UN Department of Peacekeep-
ing,18 January, (2008). 
27 See supra note 24.
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to engage in and support. Authorisation of a force intervention 
brigade with an offensive mandate, references to unmanned 
aerial vehicles (‘drones’) in mission mandates, the invocation 
of explicit links between terrorism and organised crime, and 
statebuilding mandates in the midst of open conflict – are 
all changing the nature of UN peace operations. Moreover, 
in practice, peacekeeping operations have started relying 
on new capabilities, like the use of strategic communication 
and military intelligence. Such missions are challenging the 
existing peacekeeping doctrine, and giving rise to questions 
about future developments and repercussions. They are also 
opening a range of new dilemmas for emerging powers, tradi-
tionally supporters of more limited mandates. 
 
What next?
These new developments open up new research trajectories 
for studying the positions of emerging powers on peace opera-
tions. The big underlying question is whether emerging pow-
ers have a uniform response to the doctrinal challenges arising 
out of recent UN peacekeeping practice. Turkey has had expe-
rience with stabilisation operations in the Middle East, and 
South Africa is one of the three countries to contribute forces 
to the intervention brigade in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. Russia and China did not cast negative UNSC votes in 
several recent more robust operations – behaviour unimagi-
nable even a decade ago. There is an undeniable change in the 
attitude of many emerging powers; however, it remains to be 
shown whether they define the outer limits of peacekeeping 
operations in the same way. How are these states reconciling 
established peacekeeping principles with the new reality? 
Here it would be useful to determine whether they have a 
shared understanding of the concept of robust peacekeeping 
and whether they use the same lines of argumentation when 
supporting or opposing offensive peace operations. 
Many emerging powers are major troop- and police-contrib-
uting countries. With peace operations being deployed to 
more unsecure environments, what is their readiness to take 
on heightened security risks and asymmetric threats?28 Given 
recent spikes in the number of fatalities caused by malicious 
acts in peace operations,  there is a need to determine what 
is still acceptable, for these states to continue contributing. 
Further, do emerging powers have the necessary material and 
personnel capabilities to assume expanded tasks in these 
new missions? Considering the rise of new technologies in 
peace operations, we should inquire into not only whether 
emerging powers have such capabilities, but also whether 
they see them as a welcome development. Given their reluc-
tance to support intervention in the internal affairs of other 
states, their stances are likely to be far from uniform. 
Many recent interventions have had a pivotal state or a 
regional organisation prepare the terrain for the broader UN 
peace operation. How are emerging powers reacting to such 
delegation of the use of force to pivotal states? This issue 
becomes particularly pressing when the intervening states 
have a colonial connection to the territory. Weighing the 
risks to their own peacekeepers, is this the preferred modus 
operandi for emerging powers? Does this division of labour 
represent an acceptable compromise between enforcement 
mandates and support for UN peacekeeping principles to 
emerging powers? An important aspect to study here would 
be whether membership of individual emerging powers in 
regional organisations influences their role in UN peace 
operations and stances on peacekeeping principles. 
On a substantive level, it would be useful to see how emerg-
ing powers are reacting to different types of operations, e.g., 
protection of civilians, stabilisation, state-building. There 
is an implicit assumption in the literature that responses to 
all multi-dimensional missions should be grouped together. 
However, at a time when missions are changing rapidly, it 
might be more fruitful to determine which elements enjoy 
wide support, and which not. Are some elements of on-going 
missions – for example, SSR and rule of law reforms – par-
ticularly problematic? Only by examining their positions 
on individual issues can we determine where the emerging 
powers share common ground. By answering this we can 
come closer to assessing the potential of emerging powers to 
become the leaders of an alternative vision for peace opera-
tions – or whether their primary role is and will remain as 
‘blockers’ of the liberal agenda.28 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Are new robust mandates putting UN peacekeep-
ers more at risk?’ Global Observatory (2014). 
